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
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24 November 1960



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 November 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-China: In apparent reply to the 21 November People's Daily editorial which presented the familiar Chinese arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Pravda on 23 November also editorialized on the declaration which followed the meeting of bloc leaders in 1957. It selected for emphasis, however, those aspects of the declaration--for example, on peaceful coexistence and the preventability of war--which correspond to present Soviet positions. This continuation of open discussion between the Soviet and Chinese parties while international Communist leaders are still meeting in Moscow indicates that they have been unable to resolve their disagreements and suggests that they have found it difficult to formulate a communiqué which will satisfy both parties. The moderate tone of the Pravda editorial, however, would appear to presage the probable nature of any communiqué which may result--one placing heaviest emphasis on the majority Soviet view but so worded that the Chinese can sign it and continue to claim that their views are valid.

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[Communist China - India: Relations between Peiping and New Delhi will be further exacerbated by several recent incidents in which Indian soldiers were killed or wounded on the Tibet-Sikkim border, allegedly by Chinese Communist snipers. Peiping has been pressing New Delhi for substantive border negotiations, and it seems unlikely that the incidents represent a premeditated effort by Peiping to precipitate new clashes with the Indians. Chinese troops are in the area, however, probably attempting to check the re-entry of Tibetan rebels gathered in Sikkim. New Delhi, apprehensive about its defense position in Sikkim, has recently augmented and alerted Indian troops in the area.]

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
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Thailand: Many coup rumors, of varying plausibility, are again circulating in Bangkok. The possible participants in such a move and their motivations are by no means clear. Premier Sarit, however, is [redacted] considerably concerned over the recent rash of reports and to be actively investigating them. [redacted]

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UAR: Syrian officials are displaying an attitude of friendly cooperation toward Americans unprecedented in recent years. The Syrians appear to be taking their lead from Syrian Executive Council President Sarraj, whose recent show of warmth is in marked contrast to his previously hostile, anti-US behavior. Sarraj, now apparently undisputed boss of Syria, has assumed responsibility for reviving Syria's sagging economy and may

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DAILY BRIEF

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be counting heavily on American assistance. [redacted]

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III. THE WEST

France-Algeria: Rightist opposition to De Gaulle's Algerian policy will probably be further consolidated by his appointment of the relatively liberal Louis Joxe as minister of Algerian affairs, and the selection of Jean Morin as new delegate general in Algeria. Morin is a tough administrator apparently picked for his effectiveness in handling the principal area of rightist concentration in France. There are indications that the Front for French Algeria (FAF) is planning "total disobedience" to paralyze all government services and force the army to take over in Algeria. The government is alert to this possibility [redacted]

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Haiti: The regime does not appear immediately threatened by the student strike that led it to impose martial law throughout Haiti on 22 November. However, drastic police action against the students, likely should there be public demonstrations, could cause a sudden swelling of antigovernment feeling and even widespread rioting threatening the government. President Duvalier's opponents are diverse and poorly organized, but the President is unpopular, particularly in the capital. The primary motivation for the strike is probably resentment over the President's refusal to free a student leader jailed without charges for some weeks. [redacted]

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Bolivia: President Paz has told US Ambassador Strom he may hand over the presidency "this week" to Vice President Juan Lechin--Bolivia's leftist labor leader who has often displayed an anti-US attitude--if US aid to meet pressing economic problems is not granted. Paz' difficulties are intensified by a pronounced pro-Communist, leftist drift in recent months, widespread labor and peasant unrest, serious

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violence in the Department of Cochabamba this month, and increasing pressure on the bankrupt government to accept bloc offers of aid. Strom believes that Paz' position is gravely threatened.

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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Prospects for the Republic of Korea Over the Next Few Years: Likely Future of Chang Government and Leftward Trends, Economic Stability, and Foreign Policy, Especially Toward the US and Japan, Present and Future Status of Armed Forces. NIE 42.1-2-60. 22 November 1960.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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